In this letter, we propose a fast modular reduction method over Euclidean rings, which is a generalization of Barrett's reduction algorithm over the ring of integers. As an application, we construct new universal hash function families whose operations are modular arithmetic over a Euclidean ring, which can be any of three rings, the ring of integers, the ring of Gauss integers and the ring of Eisenstein integers. The implementation of these families is efficient by using our method.
Introduction
Let R be a Euclidean ring, and a, r, f ∈ R. In many scenarios we want to compute a · r mod f.
(
The concept of Euclidean ring and the exact meaning of (1) will be given in the next section. In applications of public key cryptosystems, R = Z (the ring of integers) and R = F[z] (the univariable polynomial ring over a field F) are Euclidean rings on which the cryptosystems usually base, and in these cases the meaning of (1) is the one we usually understand.
In cryptographic applications, we often encounter the following computation environment: (i) The modular reductions of (1) are operated many times in an execution of the algorithm; (ii) In these operations, a, f remain unchanged, whilst r is changed and its size remains less than that of f ; (iii) There is no special structure of f and a (relative to f ) to be used to speedup the calculations of (1) .
For example, to find the remainder of a larger integer ω , f remain unchanged, whilst r i is changed and its size remains less than that of f . In addition, modular reductions of the form (1) frequently appear as intermediate steps in the computation of a modular exponentiation of repeatedly-squaring-andmultiplication style. Modular exponentiations are dominant operations in the implementation of the RSA cryptosystem. They are also exactly the powering operations of elements in a finite field GF(p n ) with n > 1, and the above mentioned computation environment will be encountered if the chosen defining polynomial of the finite field is not sparse. In the designs of several universal hash function families, including [1] , modular reductions of the form (1) are dominantly involved in the implementation of these function families.
A general method to compute (1) is first to calculate the product and then to calculate the remainder of this product modulo f . For a general modulus f , a usual method to calculate a remainder is the trial division and its various generalizations [2] . In cryptographic applications, such trial divisions typically have computation time several (e.g., more than 4) times that of an R-multiplication operation. If we find a method to use two R-multiplication operations to fulfill the calculation of the modular remainder, there will be a speedup of computation. Montgomery gives such a fast computation method for R = Z [3] . His method is also applicable to R = F [x] and needs a complete execution of the extended Euclidean algorithm as its pre-computation. Another method is due to Barrett [4] . It is only applicable to R = Z and needs less pre-computation than Montgomery's method. Other Euclidean rings, e.g., the ring of Gauss integers and the ring of Eisenstein integers, are also useful in the design of some important cryptosystems. For example, Williams proposes the M 3 public-key encryption scheme and proves that its security is equivalent to the difficulty of factoring an integer (the modulus used in the scheme) in Z and is equivalent to the difficulty of factoring another related integer in the ring of Eisenstein integers [5] . The idea of [5] is extended by Scheidler and Williams to cyclotomic fields of degree higher than 2 [6] . Using some efficient algorithms to calculate GCD and cubic residuosity over the ring of Gauss integers and the ring of Eisenstein integers ( [7] , [8] ), Damgard and Frandse present a primality test with much smaller error probability than the Miller-Rabin test [9] . However, no efficient modular reduction for these rings has been reported in public literatures. So it is of interest to In this letter, we propose a fast modular reduction method which is applicable to general Euclidean rings. Its pre-computation is few and is provably equivalent to that of Barrett's algorithm for the case R = Z. Our method and Barrett's one have a similar idea of estimating the quotient n/ f , but ours is applicable to general Euclidean rings. So it may be regarded as a generalization of Barrett's one. Our reductions consist of two phases, the primary reduction and the secondary one. The primary reduction calculates a remainder whose size near that of f , and the secondary reduction further reduces the remainder to a desired one. The primary reduction phase is much faster than the trial division by f . Precisely, with a pre-computation for the given f , it can be done by two R-multiplication operations. The secondary reduction can be regarded as free due to its cost, and the computational complexity of total reduction dominantly lies on the primary phase. However, the secondary phase is not trivial, and it depends on concrete Euclidean rings. For the ring of Gauss integers and the ring of Eisenstein integers, we present efficient secondary reductions. To the best of our knowledge, this method does not appear in any publications. As an application of the method, we construct new universal hash function families whose operation are modular arithmetic over a Euclidean ring. The ring can be any of three rings, the ring of integers, the ring of Gauss integers and the ring of Eisenstein integers. The implementation of these families is efficient by using our modular reduction method. In addition, the key of our families is of small size, which is in line with a direction on the design of universal hash function (e.g., see [10] ).
Preliminaries
First we give the definition of Euclidean ring according to [11] .
A Euclidean ring R is a commutative ring with identity, on which there exists a norm function N :
The above u is called a remainder of a modulo f . Note that remainders are not necessarily unique for given a and f .
For
) and N(0) = 0 ; for a ∈ R = Z, we define N(a) = |a| and restrict the remainder u to satisfy 0 ≤ u < | f |.
For the ring of Gauss integers
where
The ring of Eisenstein integers
is the ring of integers extended with a complex primitive third root of unity, ζ, i.e., a root of
is a Euclidean ring with a norm defined by N(a + bζ) = a 2 + b 2 − ab.
Fast Modular Reduction over Euclidean Rings
Let R be a Euclidean ring. For a, b ∈ R, N(a + b) is usually bounded by a small multiple of max{N(a),
Assume there is a nonzero element ρ in R such that for any integer l and any a ∈ R, Let
here we assume that there is no special structure of f and a (relative to f ) to make g 0. When r changes, we can easily compute varied h in (4). Given a, f , only a precomputation for the g in (3) is required.
As elements in the fraction field of R, we have
Below we assume that N(r) < N( f ). Take an l such that
then N(n) is bounded by a small multiple of N( f ). Concretely, for R = Z, we have
2 in (4). Therefore, we can present the following algorithm to calculate (1).
Algorithm 1
Step 1 is a pre-computation step and can be done once for fixed a and f . We call Steps 2-5 the primary reduction and Step 6 the secondary reduction.
The primary reduction reduces a·r to an element whose norm is less than a small multiple of N( f ). It dominantly involves two R-multiplications, i.e., the calculations of c and e. Another R-multiplication (that for d) is exactly the multiplication in the straight method for computing (1) . In some applications such as universal hash function families [1] , a may be special such as a power of ρ (but this particularity does not result in a speedup of the reduction modulo a general modulus), and in this case the multiplication for d is negligible in calculation time.
The secondary reduction reduces an element whose norm less than a small multiple of N( f ) to an element whose norm strictly less than N( f ). It depends on concrete Euclid rings. This step is unnecessary for R = F[x] since the primary reduction has accomplished the reduction task. The secondary reduction is obvious for R = Z, i.e., if n > f then set n ← n − f . For R = Z[i] and Z[ζ], we find simple secondary reduction methods, each of which contains only several simple comparisons and additions of integers.
We first consider the secondary reduction in the case of
Since there is an element t ∈ {±1, ±i} such that both real and imaginary parts of f · t are nonnegative, without loss of generality, we suppose both real and imaginary parts of f are nonnegative. Furthermore, we omit here the consideration of the cases of n = 0, xy = 0 and x = y since these cases are more simple. So we assume n 0, x, y > 0 and x y.
Define the sign function of n as
The following Algorithm 2 will be used in the secondary reduction for Z [i] .
Algorithm 2
otherwise n ← n + f i} 3. n ← nπ 0 and return (n).
An execution of Algorithm 2 totally needs two comparisons and several additions of integers, so its computation time is negligible. The proof of validation of Algorithm 2 is elementary and is given in Appendix.
If 0 < N(n) < 4N( f ), we can first use Algorithm 2 to get a remainder b of n modulo f (1
, and then use the algorithm again to calculate the remainder of b modulo f . This idea is organized as Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 (Secondary reduction for Z[i])
Now we consider the secondary reduction in the case of R = Z [ζ] .
. Similarly as in the previous case, we assume n 0, x, y > 0 and x y. Furthermore, we can assume x > y by properly multiplying an element of {±1, ±ζ, ±ζ 2 }. Define the sign functions of n as
The secondary reduction for Z[ζ] is quite different from that for Z[i]. It is organized as Algorithm 4.

Algorithm 4 (Secondary reduction for Z[ζ])
The proof of validation of Algorithm 4 is also elementary and very lengthy, so we omit it.
Our algorithm and Barrett's one [4] have a similar idea of estimating the quotient n/ f , and in this sense our method may be regarded as a generalization of Barrett's algorithm. However, our method is applicable to Eculidean rings other than Z. And the secondary reduction plays an indispensable role, although it is computationally free and the proof of the algorithm for it is elementary.
Application
In this section we design -AU 2 universal hash function families whose implementation is based on the fast modular reduction given in Section 3. Since the combinatorial property of an -AU 2 universal hash function family is mathematically provable and the security proof of the family needs no cryptographic hardness assumption, the "over-design" and "safety margin" principles for the design of a usual cryptographic primitive are not needed for the design of the family [12] . Furthermore, the families we design are suitable for fast software implementation, and the keys and outputs of the functions are only a few bytes.
First we design a universal hash function family based on Eisenstein integers.
Let ω be a positive integer and H be the set of all primes p congruent to 1 modulo 3 and having the length of 2ω − 1 bits. For any p ∈ H , there are some prime elements a + bζ in the ring Z [ζ] such that N(a + bζ) = p. Williams presents an algorithm to determine such a and b [5] . His idea is first to choose some z satisfying z 2 ≡ −3 mod p, then to find s and t such that p = s 2 +3t 2 for p ≡ 1 mod 3 by algorithm 1 of [5] , and finally to determine a and b by the values of s and t. Therefore, for any z satisfying z 2 ≡ −3 mod p, we can determine a unique pair (x, y) such that N(x + yζ) = p and x > y > 0 by appropriately multiplying a + bζ by an element of {±1, ±ζ, ±ζ 2 }. Replacing each prime p in H with the element x + yζ in Z[ζ] satisfying the conditions mentioned above, we denote the resulting set by H, which consists of prime elements in Z[ζ] [5] . We will take H as the key space of the universal hash function family constructed below, and take a key from H uniformly at random.
By a refined result on distribution of prime integer [13] , it is easy to show that there exist at least 2 2ω−3 ω log 2 (2ω − 1)-bit primes for ω > 10. Since about one half of primes in a large consecutive interval are congruent to 1 modulo 3 [14] , the size of H is at least 2 2ω−4 ω log 2 . Now we show how to hash a message M of length not exceeding 2nω (< 2 2ω ) bits to an element with a representation of length of 2ω bits. Denote the length of the bitstring of M by l 1 
is a 2ω-bit bitstring, and both M j1 and M j2 have the length of ω bits. The last block M k is padded into 2ω bits according to any padding rule if its length is less than 2ω bits. We regard each M j as an element m j1 +m j2 ζ of Z [ζ] , where m j1 and m j2 are the corresponding nonnegative ω-bit integers of M j1 and M j2 , respectively. Set m 0 = 1 and
Let the key be f ∈ H. The corresponding universal hash function h f is defined as
Assume
we have −2 ω < u, v < 2 ω . So, each hash value h f (M) corresponds to a unique (2ω + 2)-bit hash value (|u|, |v|, sign(u), sign(v)), where sign(x) = 1 for x > 0 and sign(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0.
To obtain the collision probability [10] of the -AU 2 universal hash function family {h f : f ∈ H}, we suppose M M and compute 
and the collision probability of the family {h f : f ∈ H} is less than nω2 5−2ω . If ω = 32 and n = 2 30 (M is a message of size 4Gbytes), then the collision probability is less than 2 −24 . This is a reasonable collision probability for application of message authentication code. By Horner's rule, 
